Security model
How Bouncer protects access, and where it stops
OpenBao stores your credentials. The Bouncer server decides who can retrieve them, and sees plain values when people view, save or create credentials in the app. A device signature proves the enrolled key was used. Whether that key is proven to be in hardware depends on the platform.
This page describes Bouncer Vault 0.5 as the source implements it.
What protects what
| Protection | What it does |
|---|---|
| Signed approvals | Only a signature from a paired device's approval key approves. A requester key or device token can never approve. |
| Exact scope | The signature covers a hash of the resource, requester, duration, reason and policy revision. An approval can't be moved to another request or another Bouncer server. |
| Single-use challenges | Each approval signs a challenge valid for one request and revision. A replayed approval is refused. |
| Short tokens | Requester read tokens are scoped to the resource and capped by its configured token lifetime and the grant's scheduled end. An early revoke needs OpenBao to revoke already-issued tokens; the stored password or API key has a separate lifetime. |
| Configured OpenBao permissions | The server role issues and revokes tokens, reads paths enabled for in-app viewing, writes enabled save paths, and reads and writes configured personal credential namespaces. It has standing read capability on those view and namespace paths. |
| Revocation | Once recorded, a revoke stops new issuance for that grant. Issued OpenBao tokens are revoked separately; failures are retried. Until revocation succeeds or the token expires, it may still be usable. |
| Storage and plaintext handling | OpenBao stores credential values at rest. Bouncer stores request, grant and audit metadata, including token accessors used for revocation. The running server handles plaintext values for views, saves and credential creation, and handles issued OpenBao tokens in memory. It is not a zero-knowledge service. |
| Pairing codes | 60 random bits, single use, valid for minutes, and limited to 10 wrong tries per address per 10 minutes. |
| Admin off the network | Admin commands use a local Unix socket on the server's machine, not the network. |
Approval keys on each platform
| Platform | Official app key design | Local check to sign |
|---|---|---|
| Android, standard key | Android Keystore (StrongBox where the phone has it) | The phone must be unlocked |
| Android, biometric key (opt-in) | Android Keystore, bound to strong biometrics | A strong biometric check for every signature |
| iPhone | Secure Enclave | Face ID or Touch ID for every signature, with no passcode fallback |
| Windows | Windows Hello passkey; the server must allow Windows Hello keys, which is off by default | Windows Hello PIN, face or fingerprint for every signature. A PC without a Hello key can see requests but not approve or deny |
The table shows how the official apps are built to store keys. The server can't verify all of it equally. The server verifies signatures against the enrolled key. Android hardware evidence depends on a successfully verified key attestation chain; use pairing.android_attestation: required when that proof is needed. The default prefer mode can accept a key without verified attestation. iPhone hardware and biometric claims are reported by the app, without equivalent server-verified attestation.
Windows Hello assertions prove use of the enrolled key with user verification. They do not tell Bouncer whether the check was a PIN, face or fingerprint. In bouncer-admin --json device list, Windows Hello keys are labelled platform-sw-uv, which means Bouncer can't verify hardware storage, not that the key is known to be stored in software. From 0.5.7, the server also checks a TPM attestation when a Windows Hello key is enrolled, if Windows supplies one, and records the result separately. No real PC has passed that check yet, and keys enrolled before 0.5.7 stay unchecked.
By design: what Bouncer leaves out
Bouncer does one job. It decides who gets a credential and for how long, and records that decision. OpenBao stores the values, and the systems people connect to run their own sessions. Most of the limits below follow from that focus, and the rest are limits of the current release. Each one says what covers it.
A value already read. Bouncer can't recall a password or key once it has been read.
How it's covered: access still ends on time. Read tokens last 5 minutes by default and never outlive the grant,
bouncer exechands a value to a command without printing it, and every view in the app is signed and recorded. An exposed value works until you change it at its source.Values given to an AI agent. The MCP
get_secrettool returns the value to the agent, so it becomes part of the conversation. It may be kept in client logs or provider records, and revoking can't recall it.How it's covered: an agent that runs commands can use
bouncer execinstead, so the value goes to the command and not to the agent. That command, anything it starts, and its output or logs can still expose the value, including to an agent that reads the output. An agent can ask for access, but its requester key can never approve.Sessions already open. Bouncer issues credentials. It doesn't proxy or record connections, so a database connection or SSH session opened during a grant may stay open until that system closes it.
How it's covered: use the target system's own session limits and logs. An SSH gateway that records sessions and ends them with the grant is planned.
SSH revocation delivery. A host blocks new logins with an issued certificate only after it fetches Bouncer's updated key revocation list (KRL). An unreachable host keeps its last list, so there is no guaranteed cut-off. Revocation-list delivery hasn't been tried on a real host yet.
How it's covered: each use gets a fresh certificate that expires on its own, within 5 minutes by default. Revocation is a second layer: the supplied timer tries to fetch the list every 15 seconds, and the server reports host delivery as unconfirmed, so monitor stale lists on the hosts.
An unlocked phone in the wrong hands. With a standard Android key, an unlocked phone is the only check.
How it's covered: opt-in biometric keys need a strong biometric check for every signature, and a resource can require approval with a biometric key. From 0.5.8, a resource can also require a key the server has verified is kept in secure hardware. An administrator can revoke a lost device, and it can't approve or see anything afterwards. Bouncer Desktop asks for Windows Hello for every signature, and the iPhone app, still in internal testing, asks for Face ID or Touch ID.
Which machine is asking. Host and client names a requester sends are shown as reported, not verified. Anyone holding a requester key can ask.
How it's covered: the approval policy still applies, and each detail is labelled Verified, Observed or Reported by requester. Give each person, host or agent its own requester key, so an administrator can disable one without affecting the others.
Bouncer itself. OpenBao lets Bouncer's role issue a token for any configured resource and read or write the enabled app paths. A compromise of the server can bypass Bouncer's application approval checks and expose values within those OpenBao permissions.
How it's covered: stored values live in OpenBao, not in Bouncer's database. The role kit sets Bouncer's permissions in OpenBao, and OpenBao enforces them, so a compromised server gets no more than that role allows. The role kit's emergency stops cut Bouncer off from OpenBao without relying on Bouncer.
The server's machine. Anyone with a shell there is the administrator. Anyone who can write to its PostgreSQL database can forge grants.
How it's covered: admin commands use a local Unix socket, never the network, and any change that loosens policy is logged and announced to approvers. Protect this machine and its database as you protect OpenBao.
Keeping the audit trail. Bouncer's approval log lives in its own database. The current release doesn't copy it off the server for you, and it doesn't record what people do after they connect.
How it's covered:
bouncer-admin log exportexports the whole log as JSON Lines for your SIEM or log store. With an OpenBao audit device on (the supplied OpenBao has one), each read is recorded with the Bouncer grant ID, so the two logs line up.Built, not yet released Built-in forwarding to syslog or a SIEM, and a hash chain that shows if an entry was changed or removed. Both are coming in the first release after 0.5.8. Neither is in 0.5.8 or earlier.
Out of scope, on purpose. The security of OpenBao, host operating systems, phones and PCs, your network, and what a requester does with a secret once it has it.
Bouncer adds an approval step on top of those systems and relies on their own controls, rather than reimplementing them.
Known limits in this release
- One server and one database, with no high availability. While the server is down, nobody gets new access through Bouncer. Tokens and SSH certificates already issued keep their own expiry. See When Bouncer is unavailable.
- People are entries in the config file. Single sign-on and directory sync aren't connected yet.
- One approval per request.
- Requester keys are bearer keys kept in a file.
- Phone notifications from your own server to the official apps aren't available yet; the apps show requests when opened.
- Standing grants (Always) are allowed by the default config. Their policy isn't settled; we recommend turning them off.
- Container images aren't signed and there is no public image registry. A prebuilt image comes with the private release.
The manual's known limits page has the full list, and says where a limit differs between versions. A paid licence doesn't remove any of these limits. Bouncer is self-hosted only; S6 Studios may offer hosted or partner-run services later. The release and platform status shows what each platform has today.
How Bouncer compares
As checked 22 November 2026. Products change, so check each vendor's current documentation before you decide. "Add-on" means a separate product or paid edition. "Not stated" means the vendor's public documentation doesn't say, not that the product lacks it. Bouncer's Planned and Built, not yet released items are on the features page.
| Feature | Bouncer | HashiCorp Vault / OpenBao | Idira (formerly CyberArk) | Delinea Secret Server | Passwordstate | 1Password Business | Teleport |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Each request approved by a person on their phone | Yes20 | Partial1 | Yes22 | Yes2 | Partial3 | Not stated | Partial4 |
| Approval signed by a hardware-backed device key | Yes5 | Not stated | Not stated | Partial6 | Not stated | Not stated | Partial7 |
| AI agent (MCP) access that waits for approval | Yes | Partial8 | Partial23 | Partial9 | Not stated | Partial10 | Partial11 |
| Self-hosted | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial12 | Yes |
| Just-in-time SSH certificates | Yes | Yes | Yes | Not stated | Not stated | Not stated | Yes |
| Session gateway and recording | Planned | Add-on13 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Not stated | Yes |
| RDP access | Planned | Add-on13 | Yes14 | Yes | Yes | Not stated | Yes |
| Single sign-on | Built, not yet released15 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial16 | Yes | Yes |
| Access that ends by itself | Yes17 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial | Partial | Yes |
| Audit log to a SIEM | Partial18 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial19 | Yes | Yes |
| Price for a small team | Free for up to 25 paired devices. Unlimited users and AI agent harnesses21 | OpenBao open source; Vault Enterprise by quote | By quote | By quote, 30-day trial | One-off per-user licences | Published per-user prices | By quote |
- Vault Enterprise control groups. The docs don't describe phone approval. We found no OpenBao equivalent.
- Through the Secret Server mobile app or a Duo push.
- Approvers decide in the web interface, and the requester is told the result by email.
- Access Requests in Teleport Enterprise (Identity Governance), with reviewers notified in tools such as Slack.
- Android Keystore, iPhone Secure Enclave or Windows Hello. The server can verify Android key attestation, and checks a Windows TPM attestation when Windows supplies one, though no real PC has passed that check yet. It can't verify an iPhone's key.
- Biometric unlock of the mobile app.
- Approving an Access Request requires WebAuthn MFA when that is the only second factor allowed.
- The Vault MCP server is in beta and has no approval step.
- A Secret Server MCP server published on Delinea's GitHub. Revealing values is off by default and can prompt the user.
- The Environments MCP server never returns values to the agent. It asks the user to authorise first use.
- MCP servers sit behind Teleport's role-based access. The docs don't say MCP access can go through Access Requests.
- A self-hosted Connect server caches data from the 1Password service.
- HashiCorp Boundary, a separate product.
- The vendor describes agentless access to Windows with temporary local users.
- Device enrolment through your identity provider is built, not yet released. Today, people are listed in the config file.
- Microsoft Entra ID and Active Directory integration.
- Standing "Always" grants are on in the default config. We recommend turning them off.
- Today: JSON export that you ship with your own job. Built-in syslog forwarding is built, not yet released.
- Audit events can be forwarded by webhook.
- On Android phones and Windows PCs. The iPhone app is in internal testing only and isn't available yet.
- Requesting agents don't count towards the device limit. Device-limit enforcement isn't active in any released version yet. Pricing for more than 25 paired devices isn't set.
- Dual control in Idira PAM Self-Hosted. Approvers confirm requests in the web interface or the Idira Mobile app.
- Idira Secure AI Agents gives agents access for the length of a task. The pages we checked don't describe a person approving each request.
What S6 Studios can see
S6 Studios doesn't run your Bouncer server and can't see your requests, decisions or secrets. Notifications carry only random IDs. The apps have no advertising, no tracking and no analytics of their own. The app privacy policy lists exactly what the apps send and to whom.
Report a security problem
If you think you've found a security problem in Bouncer, email support@bouncervault.com privately, with "Bouncer security" in the subject, rather than posting it in public. Please don't include real secrets, pairing codes or requester keys.