How Bouncer protects access
This section explains what Bouncer does to protect secrets, what it relies on, and where its protection stops. Known limits lists the limits in one place.
How it works
OpenBao stores the secret values. Bouncer's own database stores information about secrets, requesters and devices, and the record of every request and decision, but not the values. The Bouncer server does handle secret values in plain text when a device views or saves a secret, and when someone creates a personal credential. So the server's own OpenBao login can read, at any time, every secret that's enabled for viewing in the app and every personal credential, and can write where it's configured to. For a request that needs approval, a person signs the decision on a paired device, and the requester can then fetch short-lived OpenBao tokens until the grant ends. Two experimental features can give access without a new approval: existing standing grants, and personal credentials set to Always approved (Approvals and access duration).
What protects what
| Protection | What it does | Where it's enforced |
|---|---|---|
| Signed approvals | Only a signature from a paired device's approval key approves. A requester key or device token can never approve | The server checks every signature, challenge and policy rule in one transaction |
| Exact scope | The signature covers a hash of exactly what was asked: the resource, the requester, the duration and the reason. An approval can't be moved to another request | The device recomputes the hash and refuses to sign if it differs; the server checks it again |
| Short tokens | Each OpenBao token lasts minutes (5 by default), can read only that resource's paths, and never outlives its grant | OpenBao, through the role kit's policies and token roles |
| Scoped OpenBao authority | The role can issue and revoke tokens, read paths enabled for viewing, and read and write personal credential namespaces. It can write configured save paths. OpenBao does not check Bouncer's approvals | OpenBao policies; the role kit's check.sh checks their scope |
| Revocation | A revoke stops new tokens at once and asks OpenBao to revoke those already issued. SSH certificates use a revocation list each host must fetch. From 0.5.7, hosts can fetch it while OpenBao is down, once Bouncer has read the CA public key; in 0.5.6 and earlier they can't (issue #281; SSH revocation) | The server, then OpenBao |
| Values and metadata | PostgreSQL stores hashes of requester keys, device tokens and pairing codes, plus access metadata. Secret values are stored in OpenBao, and handled in server memory when a device views or saves a secret, and when someone creates a personal credential | The server's storage and API paths; this is not end-to-end encryption against the server operator |
| Admin off the network | Admin commands go over a local Unix socket, never the network | File permissions on the server's machine |
Pages in this section
- Approvals and access duration: the two clocks, and what an approval allows.
- Device keys and user verification: how each platform keeps the approval key, and what is really checked.
- Copied secrets and revocation limits: what "revoked" can and can't mean.
- Self-approval and separation of duties.
- What's covered and what isn't.
- Known limits.